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Decentralization and fiscal performance in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper provides empirical evidence on the association between decentralization and fiscal 
performance of the general government on a panel of 11 former transition countries during 1996-
2012, controlling for the effects of various demographic, institutional, and macroeconomic 
variables. Also, for robustness check we make a comparison with a panel of 18 industrialized 
European economies. The main findings from the empirical investigation suggest that 
decentralizing government activities in Central and Eastern Europe leads to an increase in the 
efficiency in the provision of public goods. Also, we show that not only the extent of fiscal 
decentralization, but the composition of local revenue, too, matters for fiscal discipline. In these 
regards, providing local governments with higher autonomy in financing their activities by relying 
more on their “own” tax revenues instead of intergovernmental grants seems to be conducive with 
fiscal discipline. In contrast to the sample consisting of the former transition economies, we cannot 
find evidence on the association between decentralization and fiscal discipline in the developed 
European countries.  
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Introduction 
 
The existing theoretical models and the accumulated empirical evidence offer divergent views on 
the association between decentralization and the fiscal performance of the general government. 
For instance, Prud’homme (1995) argues that decentralization has more detrimental than favorable 
effects on the overall fiscal position for two basic reasons: first, decentralization itself leads to 
several taxation tiers in a country; and second, the larger the autonomy of local authorities in 
deciding on the size and the composition of local expenditure, the more difficult is the co-
ordination between the various tiers of government. Under these circumstances, the process of 
formulating fiscal policy on a national level becomes increasingly complex and burdened with co-
ordination problems as the local governments might behave in accordance with their own goals 
and priorities, which might be in conflict with the macroeconomic goals as they are set up by the 
central government. This problem is emphasized when the local governments operate in terms of 
the so-called “soft budget constraints”. In that case, they are prone to excessive local expenditure, 
trying to pass over the fiscal burden on the taxpayers outside their own jurisdiction (Prud’homme 
1995). 
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization may have positive effects on the fiscal performance of 
the general government. For instance, under some theoretical assumption that local governments 
are able to supply the public goods more efficiently and to conduct the public policy in more 
transparent and accountable manner than the central government, decentralization increases the 
overall fiscal performance of the general government. In addition, as contrasted to the central 
governments that are rarely subject to constitutional constraints with respect to borrowing, legal 
limitations on budget deficits and borrowing of local governments are common practice 
throughout the world. Hence, as a result of these subnational fiscal rules, the more decentralized 
government may lead to better fiscal performance of the general government (Pereira, 2000). 
In light of these contrasted propositions it is fair to say that fiscal decentralization may produce 
different overall fiscal outcomes depending on the way the local authorities are financed. Yet, there 
is no consensus on this issue either. On the one hand, according to the “fiscal illusion” theory, the 
local governments that are financed primarily by intergovernmental transfers usually show a 
tendency to increase their public expenditure (Oates, 1991). Since fiscal transfers blur the 
relationship between the costs and the benefits of public goods, local taxpayers are stimulated to 
increase their demand for public goods. At the same time, local governments have incentives to 
increase the supply of public goods because they are able to pass the costs to the taxpayers outside 
their jurisdiction (the theory of tax-exporting).  
On the other hand, some argue that the higher level of tax autonomy associated with fiscal 
decentralization can worsen the overall fiscal performance of the general government. Specifically, 
when larger proportion of taxes is determined and collected on a sub-national level, the individual 
local governments’ fiscal policies may show strong procyclical behavior, thus, accentuating the 
macroeconomic instability. As can be seen, this argument implies that the increased reliance of 
local authorities on tax-sharing and central government grants reduces the competition for fiscal 
resources between the various tiers of government. As a result, the co-ordination of fiscal policy 
on a national level becomes easier (Thornton, 2007). 
The discussion on the effects of fiscal decentralization on overall fiscal performance cannot ignore 
the existence of another channel related to the political decision-making process and the relations 
between the politicians and the elites. For instance, decentralization may lead to weak central 
government, which is exposed to lobbying and influence from various powerful social groups. In 
these regards, in each society there are influential groups that benefit from the specific types of 
public expenditure. Consequently, they try to influence the politicians to make decisions such that 
the public policy is in line with their private interests. Here, the more decentralized political 
decision-making process makes the central government weaker as its policy will reflect the 
particular pressures from various interest groups. As a direct consequence of these political 
economy issues, the higher degree of decentralization can lead to larger public expenditure, higher 
fiscal deficits and, ultimately, to macroeconomic destabilization (Velasco, 2000). 
Despite the divergent views on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal decentralization it seems that 
there is a general consensus that a badly designed decentralization system, in which there are no 
tight limitations on local government borrowing accompanied by explicit or implicit central 
government guarantees of local debt, inevitably generates sustained fiscal deficits, ever rising 
public debt and macroeconomic instability (Martinez – Vasquez and McNab, 2003). 
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and fiscal 
performance of the general government on a panel of 11 countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
during the period of 1996-2012. In order to check for any possible differences in the 
decentralization-fiscal performance link between the “new” EU member states (the former 
communist economies) and the industrialized European countries we run an additional regression 
on a sample consisting of 18 developed European economies. In these regards, we employ two 
measures of the extent of fiscal decentralization: expenditure decentralization and vertical fiscal 
imbalance. In addition, the regression model includes several control variables capturing 
macroeconomic, demographic and institutional factors affecting the fiscal position. 
The main findings from the empirical investigation suggest that decentralizing government 
activities in Central and Eastern Europe leads to an increase in the efficiency in the provision of 
public goods. Also, we show that not only the extent of fiscal decentralization, but the composition 
of local revenue, too, matters for fiscal discipline. This finding can be justified on the ground that 
local governments use the resources more efficiently when they are financed by their own tax 
revenues. In contrast to the sample consisting of the former transition economies, we cannot find 
evidence on the association between decentralization and fiscal discipline in the developed 
European countries. 
As for the organization of the paper, the following section provides an overview of the empirical 
literature on the association between decentralization and fiscal performance. In the third section 
we offer some stylized data on budget deficits and public debt in a number of European countries 
grouped by the degree of fiscal decentralization. The fourth section provides formal econometric 
evidence on the relationship between decentralization and budget deficits, whereas the last section 
concludes. 
 
A brief review of the empirical literature 
 
In this Section we provide a brief overview of several empirical studies on the relationship between 
decentralization and the overall fiscal performance of the government after which we summarize 
the main findings. 
De Mello (2000) studies the effects of decentralization on the general government fiscal 
performance in 30 OECD and developing countries during 1970-1995. He finds that the greater 
local government tax autonomy undermines their own fiscal position. Further on, in the 
development countries, the greater reliance on intergovernmental fiscal transfers is associated to 
larger budget deficits of the central government. In the OECD countries, central government grants 
strengthen the fiscal position of local governments up to a certain limit. In addition, according to 
DeMello (2000), the fiscal performance of various levels of government depends on several 
determinants, such as: the central bank’s behavior, the terms of trade, the developments in the 
pension system associated with the demographic factors etc. 
Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) draw on the study of De Mello (2000) using the OECD tax autonomy data 
set so that they take into account only the tax revenue which are determined by local governments’ 
decisions. As a result, they obtain opposite results, i.e. higher tax autonomy reduces the extent of 
local governments’ fiscal deficits whereas intergovernmental transfers worsen their fiscal position. 
Also, they confirm that the macroeconomic effects of decentralization depend on the reaction of 
monetary policy as well as the demographic structure. 
Rodden and Wibbels (2002) investigate the association between fiscal decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability in 15 federal countries during 1978-1996. They find that the higher 
degree of expenditure decentralization leads to smaller fiscal deficits and lower inflation. Also, 
they show that the political process, too, affects the decentralization-macroeconomic performance 
link, i.e. fiscal deficits and inflation are lower in the countries where the same political parties hold 
the power on both national and sub-national level. 
Recently, based on a sample of 16 industrialized and developing countries over 1980-1998, 
Neyapti (2010) confirms the negative effects of decentralization on budget deficits, but shows that 
these effects are not uniform, depending on various institutional features. Finally, Eyraud and 
Lusinyan (2013) provide empirical evidence for the OECD countries suggesting that to the extent 
that local governments are financed mostly by fiscal transfers and borrowing it undermines their 
fiscal discipline, thus, leading to larger fiscal imbalances of the general government. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the empirical literature suggests that the macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal decentralization depend on various factors, such as: the extent of the local 
expenditure decentralization, the degree of tax autonomy, the importance of intergovernmental 
transfers and borrowing as sources of finance, as well as the country’s demographic, political and 
institutional characteristics. 
 
Decentralization and fiscal performance: Industrialized European countries versus Central 
and Eastern European countries 
 
Before providing the formal econometric evidence we present some stylized facts on the general 
government fiscal performance (budget deficits and public debt) in 31 European countries with 
different extent of fiscal decentralization during 1995-2013. In these regards, we divided the 
countries in the following four groups: highly decentralized countries, i.e. those where the share 
of sub-national in the total public expenditure exceeds 20% (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden); 
upper-middle decentralized countries in which sub-national expenditure account from 10% to 20% 
in the total public expenditure (the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, France, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and UK); lower-middle decentralized countries 
whose share of sub-national expenditure ranges from 5% to 10% (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Portugal, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Spain); and 
countries with low degree of decentralization with the share of sub-national expenditure less than 
5% (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Malta). Figure 1 shows the budget deficits in each of the four 
groups over 1995-2013. 
 
Fugure 1 approx. here 
 
As can be seen, the budget balance show similar cyclical pattern in all the countries in our sample. 
However, it is clear that, in general, the countries with higher degree of decentralization of public 
expenditure have lower budget deficits compared to the other groups. Indeed, highly decentralized 
countries form the only group showing a positive budget balance (0.4% on average). In contrast, 
the upper-middle decentralized countries show an average budget deficit of 2% whereas the fiscal 
performance of the lower-middle group is slightly worse (an average deficit of 2.7%). Finally, the 
countries with low level of decentralization are simultaneously those with higher budget deficits 
(4.9% on average). Further on, these countries have experienced the most dramatic worsening of 
the budget balance during the Global Economic Crisis when the group’s average budget deficit 
reached 9.8% in 2009 and 12.6% in 2010. As an illustration, the average budget deficit of the 
highly decentralized group stood at 2.2% in 2009 while the corresponding figures of the two 
middle groups were 5.7% and 5.55, respectively. 
Figure 2 depicts the public debt in the four groups of European countries confirming the previous 
conclusion that more decentralized countries have superior fiscal performance than less 
decentralized ones. Specifically, the highly decentralized group had managed to reduce the public 
debt from 66.1% in 1995 to 46.5% in 2013, which stands in sharp contrast to the other three groups 
where the level of indebtedness had increased during the same period. It is striking that the public 
debt in the less decentralized countries had almost doubled from 64.5% in 1995 to 117.6% in 2013. 
As a result, despite the same initial level of public debt, the fiscal performance in the most and 
least decentralized countries had diverged sharply. 
 
Figure 2 approx. here 
 
The above plots of the relationship between decentralization and budget deficits (public debt) are 
given for illustrative purpose only and need not be interpreted as implying causality from 
decentralization to fiscal performance. For instance, one may argue that, in addition to 
decentralization, it is reasonable to assume that the overall fiscal position of the government 
depends on various other determinants, which have been omitted in the above figures, such as: the 
demographic characteristics of the population, the social welfare system etc. Moreover, it may be 
interesting to explore whether the observed pattern is true for the former transition economies from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we now provide a formal econometric testing of the 
association between these two variables. 
 
Decentralization and fiscal performance: Econometric evidence  
 
Data and methodology 
The above descriptive analysis suggests that there may be a negative association between fiscal 
decentralization and budget deficits (public debt). At least, we have the observed the mere fact 
that, on average, the European countries with higher degree of decentralization at the same time 
have lower budget deficits and lower public debt. In this Section we provide a formal econometric 
evidence of the above proposition and, specifically, to test its validity on the sample of Central and 
Eastern European countries. In these regards, we regress the budget balance as a proxy for the 
fiscal discipline on public expenditure. As this measure represent an imperfect proxy for fiscal 
decentralization, we use another measure of decentralization – the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers. In this way, we are able to check whether the composition of local financing, i.e. the 
reliance on own revenues versus fiscal transfers, has any effect on the fiscal position of the general 
government. 
Our empirical investigation of the relationship between decentralization and fiscal performance is 
based on annual data for a panel of 11 countries from Central and Eastern Europe during the period 
of 1996-2012. Specifically, the panel consists of the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In order 
to check for any possible differences in the decentralization-fiscal performance link between the 
“new” EU member states (the former communist economies) and the industrialized European 
countries we run an additional regression on a sample consisting of 18 developed European 
economies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.  
As mentioned above, we measure the overall fiscal discipline by the budget balance (budget) of 
the general government (as a percent of GDP), which is the dependent variable in the regression 
model. We employ two measures of the extent of fiscal decentralization: expenditure 
decentralization (locexp), i.e. the share of sub-national government expenditure in total 
government expenditure (general government) and the vertical fiscal imbalance (grant), i.e. the 
share of intergovernmental grants in total local government revenue. 
Since fiscal policy is normally influenced by various macroeconomic, institutional and 
demographic factors, the budget balance is specified as a function of the following control 
variables: unemployment (output gap), public debt, health care expenditure, and the older 
population. The public debt (debt) is included in the regression because it affects the budget 
balance through the costs for servicing the existing debt. The output gap variable (gap), expressed 
as a percent of GDP, is included in order to control for the fiscal implication of the business cycle 
via the so-called automatic stabilizers. The output gap is constructed as a difference between the 
actual and potential output. The data on the output gap are extracted from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook Database, which contains such data for the 18 industrialized European 
countries and only for three out of 11 Central and Eastern European economies. As a consequence, 
in the regression with the latter sample the output gap has been replaced by the unemployment rate 
(unemploy) as a proxy of the business cycle. As social welfare accounts for a large share in total 
government expenditure, we include two control variables: the health care expenditure as a percent 
of GDP (health) and the share of older people (those aged 65 and over) in the total population 
(old), which affects the size of the pension system. 
The empirical model has the following general specification: 
yit = αi + γzit + xit β' + uit                        (1) 
where:  
- y is the dependent variable (budget);  
- z represents the various alternative measures of fiscal decentralization (locexp and 
grant);  
- x is a k-dimensional vector of explanatory control variables (debt, gap, unemp, health, 
old); 
- α , γ and β are the constant, the parameter before the fiscal decentralization variable and 
the k-dimensional vector of parameters of the control variables, respectively; 
-  u are the residuals; 
- i and t are the country and time subscripts, respectively. 
We employ the fixed-effects panel data model, which seems to be more appropriate when working 
with macro panels, especially when the cross-sections are not sampled randomly and when the 
research focuses on the behaviour of the specific sample without drawing inferences about the 
whole population. In addition, the fixed-effects estimator is consistent even when individual 
effects are correlated with the regressors (Baltagi, 2008). In these regards, the assumption that the 
regressors are not correlated with the disturbance term, which is critical for employing the random 
effects model, seems to be a priori unrealistic (Wooldridge, 2002) as many of the regressors 
included in the model may be correlated with the unobserved country-specific effects. Formally, 
we base our choice of the fixed-effects vis-á-vis the random-effects model on the Hausman-test 
(Hausman, 1978), which in each case rejects the null-hypothesis that the regressors and the 
disturbances are not correlated. In addition, our preference for the fixed-effects model is supported 
by the results of the F-test for the joint significance of the fixed effects. Finally, coping with 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation we have estimated the panel model with AR(1) error term 
using the White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. 
 
Main findings and discussion 
 
Since we use different measures of fiscal decentralization we have estimated two regressions for 
the Central and Eastern European countries and two regressions for the industrialized European 
economies. 
 
Table 1 approx. here 
The second column of Table 1 shows the estimates from the regression with the expenditure 
decentralization as explanatory variable. As can be seen, the coefficient of locexp has a positive 
sign and it both statistically significant (at 1%) and economically important. Specifically, 
increasing the share of local expenditure in total public expenditure by one percentage point is 
associated with an improvement in the budget balance by 0.25 percentage points. Hence, this 
finding implies that fiscal decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe can be considered an 
effective mechanism for ensuring fiscal discipline of the general government. This result may be 
explained with the initially high level of centralization in the former communist countries in which 
the public sector was large and highly inefficient. Under these conditions, decentralizing 
government activities (accompanied by widespread reforms towards democratization of the 
society and introducing market economy) leads to an increase in the efficiency in the provision of 
public goods (Shah, 2004). 
Further on, the positive influence of fiscal decentralization on overall fiscal performance is 
confirmed the third column of Table 1, too, which shows the estimates of the regression with the 
vertical fiscal imbalance (grant) as a proxy for decentralization. Here, the regression coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant (at 10%) though with a much lower magnitude, i.e. increasing 
the share of fiscal transfers in total local government expenditure by one percentage point is 
associated with a decline of the budget balance by 0.025 percentage points. Hence, this finding 
supports the view that not only the extent of fiscal decentralization, but the composition of local 
revenue, too, matters for fiscal discipline. In these regards, providing local governments with 
higher autonomy in financing their activities by relying more on their “own” tax revenues instead 
of intergovernmental grants seems to be conducive with fiscal discipline. This finding can be 
justified on the ground that local governments use the resources more efficiently when they are 
financed by their own tax revenues. In addition, it is common that in the countries where 
institutions are weak fiscal transfers are allocated on discretionary terms based on pure political 
considerations and disregarding economic efficiency. 
As for the effects of the control variables included in the regression the main findings are in line 
with the a priori expectations, i.e. we find a negative association between the level of public debt, 
unemployment and health care expenditure on the budget balance. All these regression coefficients 
are statistically significant at 1% or 5%. Also, the inclusion of the autoregressive term of order one 
is warranted, thus, confirming the existence of considerable inertia in the fiscal position of the 
general government. The only exception is the coefficient of the older population, which is not 
significant and/or has the “wrong” sign. 
In sum, we provide empirical support to the advocates of decentralization, who claim that it 
delivers more efficient government, thus strengthening the fiscal position of general government. 
In these regards, the result from our study are consistent with several theoretical explanations. For 
instance, Oates (1972) argues that local governments usually have a comparative advantage in the 
allocation of resources as compared to the central government, i.e. by bringing government “closer 
to the people”, fiscal decentralization provides a better match between local preferences and local 
policies. In addition, some authors (for instance, Grossman, 1989; Grossman and West, 1994) 
emphasize that the importance of the way the decentralization is implemented. When the local and 
central government, instead of competing for the scarce fiscal resources, engage in various 
arrangements for sharing the common fiscal resources, it results in the “race” for larger expenditure 
from the “common pool” of public revenues. This is the essence of the so-called “collusion” or 
“common pool” hypothesis, which claims that, when local expenditure is financed by fiscal 
transfers, decentralization results in larger government (Grossman, 1989). Similarly, Rodden 
(2003) argues that intergovernmental transfers undermine fiscal discipline for the following 
reason: when local public goods are financed by transfers from the central government the costs 
are borne not only by the local citizens (who benefits from the local public goods) but they are 
spread on the whole population. In that case, the demand for local public goods will be larger 
because part of the costs is transferred to the non-residents instead of being internalized. 
Finally, intergovernmental transfers lead to the so-called “soft budget constraints” at the local 
government level. In these regards, Stein (1998) argues that, when faced with various fiscal shocks 
(higher interest rates on the debt, lower local tax revenue etc.), local governments that rely on 
intergovernmental transfers as a source of finance feel lesser pressure for adjustment and could 
afford a higher level of local expenditure for a longer time period (by increasing their debt). The 
reason for this type of behavior is that both the politicians and the voters expect that the central 
government, which has already finances the current expenditure of the local governments, would 
finance their debt, too, especially when the allocation of the intergovernmental transfers is based 
on discretion instead of legally-binding rules. 
 
Comparison with the industrialized European countries 
 
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 list the estimates from the same regression model on a 
sample of 18 industrialized European economies. Again, we provide the results for the two 
specifications, which employ different measures of decentralization. In contrast to the sample 
consisting of the former transition economies, we cannot find evidence on the association between 
decentralization and fiscal discipline in the developed European countries. Specifically, the 
coefficients of expenditure decentralization is negative, thus, implying that decentralization 
threatens the overall fiscal position. On the other hand, the obtained negative coefficient of the 
vertical fiscal balance suggests that the reliance on intergovernmental transfers weakens the fiscal 
position of the general government. However both regression coefficients are not statistically 
significant. One possible explanation of these findings could be related to the presumed higher 
fiscal discipline of the central government in the industrialized European countries in comparison 
with the former transition economies. At the same time, the presence of rule-based allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers alleviates the negative effects associated with the “common pool” 
problem. As a result, decentralizing expenditure to the sub-national level does not offer the same 
benefits that are observed in the Central and Eastern European countries. Finally, with regards to 
the other variables in the empirical model, the results are comparable to those for the former 
transition economies. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and fiscal 
performance of the general government on a panel of 11 countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
during the period of 1996-2012. In order to check for any possible differences in the 
decentralization-fiscal performance link between the “new” EU member states (the former 
communist economies) and the industrialized European countries we run an additional regression 
on a sample consisting of 18 developed European economies. In these regards, we employ two 
measures of the extent of fiscal decentralization: expenditure decentralization and vertical fiscal 
imbalance. In addition, the regression model includes several control variables capturing 
macroeconomic, demographic and institutional factors affecting the fiscal position. 
The main findings from the empirical investigation suggest that decentralizing government 
activities in Central and Eastern Europe leads to an increase in the efficiency in the provision of 
public goods. Also, we show that not only the extent of fiscal decentralization, but the composition 
of local revenue, too, matters for fiscal discipline. In these regards, providing local governments 
with higher autonomy in financing their activities by relying more on their “own” tax revenues 
instead of intergovernmental grants seems to be conducive with fiscal discipline. This finding can 
be justified on the ground that local governments use the resources more efficiently when they are 
financed by their own tax revenues. In contrast to the sample consisting of the former transition 
economies, we cannot find evidence on the association between decentralization and fiscal 
discipline in the developed European countries.  
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Figure 1: The budget balance in selected European countries, 1995-2013 (% of GDP)  
 
 
 
Source: Own estimates based on the EUROSTAT database. 
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Figure 2: The public debt in selected European countries, 1995-2013 (% of GDP)  
 
 
 
Source: Own estimates based on the EUROSTAT database. 
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Table 1: Regression output from the fixed-effects panel data model 
Variables Central and Eastern Europe Industrialized European countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
const 11.286** 
(4.489) 
11.397** 
(4.551) 
11.597** 
(4.906) 
13.039*** 
(4.710) 
locexp 0.252*** 
(0.047) 
 -0.002 
(0.015) 
 
grant  -0.025* 
(0.014) 
 -0.024 
(0.020) 
debt -0.079** 
(0.033) 
-0.100** 
(0.042) 
-0.057* 
(0.030) 
-0.062** 
(0.031) 
gap   0.373*** 
(0.058) 
0.477*** 
(0.051) 
unemp -0.183** 
(0.071) 
-0.191*** 
(0.066) 
  
health -2.083*** 
(0.589) 
-1.728*** 
(0.550) 
-2.137*** 
(0.518) 
-1.670*** 
(0.412) 
old -0.278 
(0.271) 
0.025 
(0.202) 
0.357 
(0.394) 
0.155 
(0.368) 
AR(1) 0.462*** 
(0.075) 
0.489*** 
(0.084) 
0.564*** 
(0.035) 
0.546*** 
(0.036) 
R2 0.713 0.709 0.879 0.886 
F-statistics 20.509*** 19.624*** 82.943*** 84.934*** 
Observations 149 146 261 260 
Notes: 
1. ***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
2. F-test for the significance of the fixed effects (p-value in the parentheses). 
3. White’s standard-errors in the parentheses below the regression coefficients. 
 
